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LEAHY—SHARPENING THE BLADE  
 





Over the course of the last 20 years, the Leahy Law has become one 
of the cornerstones of foreign and human rights policy.  Yet, despite 
its largely unchallenged importance, field practitioners and other 
stakeholders have identified a number of substantive and practical 
deficiencies that greatly diminish the law’s ability to achieve the 
desired effect, and worse, may pose a risk to the United States’ 
interests. In reflecting on these deficiencies, and armed with 
decades of data and anecdotal evidence, this Article proposes 
adjustments focused on better aligning the law’s intent and effect.  
These recommendations range from semantic edits to substantive 
policy changes which may affect the way that Leahy operates in 
substantial ways.  We should not fear revisiting the original 
intentions now that we have seen how the law operates.  Like all 
things, the Leahy Law must be continually improved or it risks 
becoming an empty remnant of its former self.  America needs to be 
a world leader in the area of human rights, but it requires functional 
tools in order to do so.  Congress needs to sharpen the blade and 
it’s the author’s hope that, by implementing the changes presented 
in this Article, it can do just that. 
 
                                                
* Captain Nandor Kiss is a Judge Advocate in the United States Army. He 
is currently serving as a military prosecutor at Fort Bliss, Texas and previously served 
as an Operations Officer and Legal Advisor for Essential Function 3 – Rule of Law, 
part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Kabul, Afghanistan. Special thanks to 
Colonel Andrew McKee for helping navigate Department of Defense pre-publication 
review, and to Major Joey Comley, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Baileys, and my 
wife, Captain Erin Kiss, for reviewing my drafts and providing their thoughts and 
advice. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Department of Defense or its components. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the hills of the Morazán region of el Salvador, near the 
Honduran border sits the village of El Mozote.  It is one of those 
small corners of the world that typically eludes the attention of the 
global community, and likely would have, had it not been for one 
chilling ordeal in the early 1980s.  At the time, the Morazán region 
was home to a number of guerilla groups that had been consistently 
evading the Salvadoran government during the country’s civil war.1  
Eventually, one battalion of the Salvadoran armed forces found their 
way to the village of El Mozote and over the course of three days 
tortured, raped, and killed over 800 Civilians.2 
 On the morning of December 10, 1981, the Atlacatl 
Battalion of the Salvadoran Army rounded up the civilian 
inhabitants of the village in an attempt to obtain information on the 
whereabouts of certain guerrilla leaders.3  During the day, the 
victims were forcibly removed from their homes, gathered in the 
village’s central plaza and made to lay in the dirt as Soldiers kicked 
and beat them and stole their jewelry and other valuables.4  By 
nightfall, the citizens of the village were told to return to their homes 
and not leave or they would face immediate execution.5  The 
following morning, the people were again pulled from their homes 
and divided into groups of men, boys, girls, women, and children.6  
The male inhabitants were led to the church to be either immediately 
executed by decapitation or point-blank shots to the head; or, to be 
tortured for information.7  At the same time, the girls and women 
were marched up a hillside where they were raped, and then 
summarily murdered.8  The children, recently orphaned, were 
moved to an empty home where they too were systematically 
                                                
1 See LEIGH BINFORD, THE EL MOZOTE MASSACRE 13–15 (1996) 
(explaining how the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) organized its base in the 
Morzan region). 
2 See id. at 18–22. 
3 Id. at 18–19. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 20. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 21. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/4
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executed; one after the other.9  The remaining structures were 
vandalized, the homes burned, and the animals killed and burned 
with the bodies of their former owners.10 
The story of what would later be known as the El Mozote 
massacre is a glimpse into the darkest side of humanity and while it is 
a truly terrifying story, it is far from the sole example of this type of 
barbarity being administered to innocent Civilians in remote reaches 
of the globe.  However, the reason why the El Mozote massacre 
reached its heights of infamy was that the Atlacatl Battalion was 
trained and equipped by the U.S.11 
During the Cold War, the U.S.’ foreign policy began to focus 
on developing partner nation’s capacity in order to allies in the fight 
against the existential communist threat.12  One of earliest efforts to do 
so was the School of the Americas (“SOA”), founded in 1946.13  The 
purpose of the SOA was to train military forces in Central and 
Southern American countries to develop them into strong allies 
against communist forces.14  Early on, the SOA was viewed as wise 
foreign policy and likely would have continued to had it not been for 
the stories that started trickling in about U.S. trained Soldiers 
committing human rights violations.15  One of the most egregious 
incidents being the story at the beginning of this Article.16 
                                                
9 Id. at 21-22. 
10 Id. at 20–21. 
11 See MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL MOZOTE 3–10 (1994); see 
also JAMES HODGE & LINDA COOPER, DISTURBING THE PEACE: THE STORY OF 
FATHER ROY BOURGEOIS AND THE MOVEMENT TO CLOSE THE SCHOOL OF THE 
AMERICAS 91 (2004) (describing the events that led to the creation of SOA 
Watch); JACK NELSON–PALLMEYER, SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS: GUNS, GREED, AND 
GLOBALIZATION 1–13, 21–32 (2001) (describing how the United States trained 
and equipped the Atlacatl Battalion and the School of Americas). 
12 See NELSON–PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 14–15 (2001) (discussing 
the policy to combat communism during the Cold War). 
13 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO 96-178, SCHOOL OF THE 
AMERICAS: U.S. MILITARY TRAINING FOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 1 (1996) 
[hereinafter GAO 96-178]; HODGE & COOPER, supra note 11, at 91.  
14 GAO 96-178, supra note 13, at 5–8; HODGE & COOPER, supra note 11, 
at 91. 
15 See HODGE & COOPER, supra note 11, at 91. 
16  Ian Urbina, O.A.S. to Reopen Inquiry into Massacre in El Salvador in 
1981, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2005), 
5
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Upon the realization that these atrocities were occurring, and 
that the Soldiers committing them had been trained by the U.S., 
increased scrutiny was applied to which nations and which units were 
allowed to receive U.S. funding and support.17  The call to action was 
answered by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, through the passage 
of what eventually became known as the eponymous “Leahy Laws,”18 
which have now become the cornerstone of U.S. human rights policy. 
The Leahy Law, also known as Leahy Amendment, was an 
attempt to prevent U.S. funding or security assistance making its way 
into the hands of known human rights violators19   It had, and 
continues to have, a noble intent and should continue to be one of the 
primary weapons brandished against human rights abuse in the world.  
However, over the past three and a half decades a number of 
substantive and practical deficiencies emerged that greatly diminish 
the law’s ability to achieve the originally desired effect.  These 
deficiencies have also created a potential negative impact to U.S. 
forces and interests as the U.S. has turned increasingly to allied forces 
to perform tasks that were once the exclusive prevue of the U.S. armed 
forces. 
In order to correct these deficiencies, a number of small, yet 
important, changes are necessary.  This Article will identify some of 
the well-documented problems in the law’s ability to achieve its 
purpose and propose a number of adjustments to the law that may 
better align its intent and effect.  These recommendations range from 
semantic edits to substantive policy changes which may affect the way 
that Leahy operates in substantial ways.  Importantly, these 
adjustments are intended to work in isolation from one another; their 
                                                
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/08/world/americas/oas-to-reopen-inquiry-
into-massacre-in-el-salvador-in-1981.html. 
17 See, e.g., About - School of the Americas Watch, SCH. OF THE 
AMERICAS WATCH, https://www.soaw.org/about/ (last visited May 20, 2019) 
(outlining the actions of SOA Watch, a non-profit group focused on monitoring 
human rights abuses committed by graduates of the SOA).  
18Human Rights, U.S. SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY OF VT., 
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/issues/human-rights. 
19 Daniel R. Mahanty, The “Leahy Law” Prohibiting US Assistance to 
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effectiveness should not depend on how many are ultimately 
implemented.  Each amendment would, independently, improve the 
law’s ability to achieve its end. 
This Article will proceed with a short background section, 
discussing the how the Leahy Law functions, the history of how it 
came to be, its precursors, major amendments, and expansion.  Parts 
III through VI will then focus on individual weaknesses in the law that 
have been identified, and the existing conflicts that exist between the 
intent and effect.  These Sections will also propose recommended 
adjustments or policy changes that are likely to correct, or at least 
mitigate, the problems in Leahy’s functionality.  This Article will then 
make some conclusory remarks. 
The Leahy Law is incredibly important to U.S. foreign policy, 
especially in the area of human rights.  Due in large part to its 
importance, it must be continually improved and refined.  Armed with 
over thirty years of data and anecdotal evidence, this Article aims to 
serve as a whetstone to sharpen the blade and ensure that America’s 
cornerstone weapon against human rights abuse remains as capable as 
it was originally intended to be. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. How Leahy Works 
1. The Law 
The Leahy Law is a segment of law that has been injected in 
the authorizations for both the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense.20  Named after Vermont Senator Patrick 
Leahy, the law is intended to prevent U.S. Foreign Assistance to units 
of foreign security forces if there is “credible information” that the 
unit, or any of its individual members, has committed a gross violation 
of human rights.21  Once it has been discovered that a unit has violated 
the Leahy law, it cannot receive any U.S. funding until it has taken 
                                                
20 Leahy Law Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, https://www.state.gov/key-topics-
bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/human-rights/leahy-law-fact-
sheet/ (last updated Jan. 22, 2019). 
21 Id. 
7
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adequate measures to “remediate” the violation.22 
While the Leahy law is typically referred to as if it were a 
single statute, it is actually a pair of similar, though not identical, 
provisions located in different authorizations.23   
 The Defense version of the law, located in the Howard P. 
“Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act, reads as 
follows: 
 
Of the amounts made available to the Department of Defense, none may 
be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for a unit of a 
foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information 
that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights . . . This 
prohibition shall not apply if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation 
with the Secretary of State, determines that the government of such 
country has taken all necessary corrective steps, or if the equipment or 
other assistance is necessary to assist in disaster relief operations or other 
humanitarian or national security emergencies . . . The Secretary of 
Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the 
prohibition…if the Secretary determines that the waiver is required by 
extraordinary circumstances.24 
 The State Department version, located in Section 
620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (“FAA”), 
is as follows: 
No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter or the Arms Export 
Control Act [22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.] to any unit of the security forces of a 
foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such 
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The prohibition . . . 
shall not apply if the Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives, and the Committees on Appropriations that the 
government of such country is taking effective steps to bring the responsible 
members of the security forces unit to justice . . . In the event that funds are 
withheld from any unit pursuant to this section, the Secretary of State shall 
promptly inform the foreign government of the basis for such action and 
shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assist the foreign government in 
taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security 
                                                
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 10 U.S.C. § 362 (2016) (“[P]rohibition on use of funds for assistance 
to units of foreign security forces that have committed a gross violation of human 
rights”) (emphasis added). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/4
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forces to justice.25 
 
It is important to note that while the laws appear to be the same 
on the first read, there are a number of key differences between the 
two versions.  The three primary variances are the difference in 
remediation standards: “taking effective steps to bring the responsible 
members to justice” as opposed to the Defense standard “all necessary 
corrective steps have been taken.”  The second is the Secretary of 
Defense’s ability to waive the law’s prohibitions in “extraordinary 
circumstances.”  The third is the “duty to inform” provision requiring 
the Secretary of State to promptly inform a foreign government of the 
basis for withholding funding or support and the duty to assist the 
foreign government to take effective steps towards remediation.26  
These differences, and their impacts, will be discussed in greater 
length in Part V of this Article. 
a. Security Forces 
The Department of State is silent on the specific definition of 
“security forces,” but the Department of Defense defines it as both the 
“duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary 
forces of a state,”27 as well as, “forces including but not limited to: 
military forces; police forces; border police, coast guard, and customs 
officials; paramilitary forces; forces peculiar to specific nations, state, 
tribes, or ethnic groups; prison correctional and penal services; 
infrastructure protection forces; and governmental ministries or 
departments responsible for the above forces.”28  
                                                
25 22 U.S.C § 2378d (1961) (“[L]imitation on assistance to security 
forces”) (emphasis added). 
26 NINA M. SERAFINO, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R43361, “LEAHY 
LAW” HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE: ISSUE OVERVIEW 
1, 5 (2014).  
27 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION, 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, i, 213 (2016). 
28 U.S. ARMED FORCES, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-22 FOREIGN INTERNAL 
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b. Gross Violations of Human Rights 
Another important consideration is the determination of what, 
specifically, constitutes a “gross violation of human rights” 
(“GVHR”).  These determinations are to be informed by existing 
norms in international law.  The Department of State version of the act 
states that “the  term ‘gross violations of  internationally  recognized  
human rights’  includes  torture  or  cruel,  inhumane,  or  degrading  
treatment  or  punishment,  prolonged  detention without charges and  
trial,  causing  the  disappearance  of  persons by the  abduction and  
clandestine  detention  of  those  persons, and other flagrant denial  of  
the  right to  life,  liberty,  or  the security  of  person.”29  According to 
the State Department, the definition also includes extrajudicial killings 
as well as any politically motivated rape.30 
c. Units 
The Leahy law specifies that in the event an allegation is 
substantiated, it is only the specific “unit” rather than the entirety of 
the armed forces that is subject to Leahy sanctions. According to 
Congress, the term “unit” is intended to be “construed as the smallest 
operational group in the field that has been implicated in the reported 
violation.”31  In practice, this means that if there is information that 
someone within a unit has committed a gross violation of human 
rights, the entire unit is barred unless it can be established that the 
incident was the responsibility of a smaller, subordinate unit.  As a 
result, the more detailed the information about the alleged incident, the 
smaller the effect of Leahy sanctions. 
2. Remediation 
The Leahy law features a few exceptions, the most important 
of which is for remediation. Under this exception, the Departments of 
State or Defense may continue to provide security assistance after 
                                                
29 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 502B(d)(1) Pub. L. No. 87-195 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 2340(d)(I)). 
30 SERAFINO, ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.  
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determining that sufficient remedial steps have been taken to address 
the human rights violation.32  In order to use this exception, the 
Department of Defense version requires the Secretary of Defense, 
after consultation with the Secretary of State, determine that the 
government of such country has taken all necessary corrective steps.33  
The Department of State version merely requires that the Secretary of 
State determine that the government of the violating country is taking 
effective steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces 
unit to justice.34  Congress has not expressly defined either of these 
standards, nor has there been any express rationale provided justifying 
the need for two separate standards. 
In 2015, the Departments of State and Defense adopted a joint 
policy on remediation which established a three-step process to 
declare a unit remediated.35  The policy lays out three primary 
components of the remediation process: (1) investigation; (2) as 
appropriate, judicial or administrative adjudication; and (3) as 
appropriate, sentencing or comparable administrative actions.36  Once 
a senior U.S. official in a country or embassy is satisfied that these 
steps have been taken, the information will be forwarded to a review 
panel at the Secretarial level to decide whether the unit has been 
remediated.37  Once remediation has been declared, the unit may once 
                                                
32 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Additional 
Guidance on Implementation of Section 8057(b), DoD Appropriations Act, 2014 
(Division C of Public Law 113-76) (“the DoD Leahy law”) and New or 
Fundamentally Different Units” 9 (Feb. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Secretary of 
Defense Memorandum]. 
33 10 U.S.C. § 362 (emphasis added). 
34 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2014) (emphasis added). 
35 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DODIG-2018-018, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
DOD LEAHY LAW REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE BY 
MEMBERS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES 10–11 
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://media.defense.gov/2017/Nov/17/2001845582/-1/-
1/1/DODIG-2018-018.PDF [hereinafter DODIG-2018-018]. This memo also 
states that, as a matter of policy, the remediation standards will be treated the 
same. Id. This is explained in further detail in Part V, infra. 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 Id. at 10–11. The process is slightly more complex than explained here. 
The review panel, called the Remediation Review Panel (RRP) is made up of 
several DoD and DoS stakeholders who decide whether the standard has been 
met. Id. at 10-11. If they are unable to agree, the issue is elevated to a Senior 
Remediation Review Panel (SRRP), then to the Assistant Secretary level, and 
11
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again begin receiving  U.S. security assistance.38 
3. Additional DoD Exceptions 
In addition to the remediation exception which appears in 
both the State and Defense version of the Leahy law, there are two 
additional exceptions within the DoD version of the law and other 
exceptions that exist outside the statutes themselves.  The first 
express DoD exception, added in 2014 as part of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act,39 is for equipment or other assistance necessary 
to assist in disaster relief operations or other humanitarian or 
national security emergencies.40  The other exception is a waiver 
that allows the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the 
Secretary of State, to waive the prohibitions against funding 
training, assistance, or other equipment if the Secretary of Defense 
determines that such a waiver is required by “extraordinary 
circumstances.”41  Although this may seem like an easy way to avoid 
the Leahy law’s prohibitions, it has never been used.42  This is 
partially due to the fact that Congress has never defined 
“extraordinary circumstances” for the purposes of this law.43  
Other than the exceptions written into the Leahy laws 
themselves, some other statutes and appropriations contain built-in 
exceptions to Leahy.44  The most well-known example of this is the 
Afghan Security Forces Fund (“ASFF”).45 The relevant provision 
                                                
ultimately to the Secretaries themselves. For those interested, the specifics of this 
process are explained in the joint policy memorandum. See id 
38 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, supra note 32, at 9.  
39 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 621, 
128 Stat. 5, 228. 
40 10 U.S.C. § 362 (2016). 
41 Id. 
42 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 13-866, HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, MONITORING, AND TRAINING COULD IMPROVE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEAHY LAWS 7 (2013) hereinafter GAO 13-866]. 
43 DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 9 n.30.  
44 See, e.g., § 8057, 128 Stat. 5. 
45 See, e.g., James LaPorta, Report: Pentagon skirted U.S. law on human 
rights abuses in Afghanistan, UPI (Jan. 23, 2018, 4:59 PM), 
https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2018/01/23/Report-Pentagon-skirted-US-
law-on-human-rights-abuses-in-Afghanistan/9321516732458/; OFFICE OF THE 
SEC’Y OF DEF., JUSTIFICATION FOR FY 2020 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/4
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within the ASFF is known as the “notwithstanding” authority.  It 
reads: 
 
That such funds shall be available to the Secretary of Defense, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purpose of allowing 
the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, 
or the Secretary’s designee, to provide assistance, with the concurrence of 
the Secretary of State, to the security forces of Afghanistan, including the 
provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and 
infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction, and funding.46 
 
Upon first read, it doesn’t appear to mean much but it 
provides the commander of Combined Security Transition 
Command—Afghanistan (“CSTC-A”)47 with the authority to waive 
the provisions of any other provision of law, including Leahy, if she 
determines it necessary.  Despite the seemingly broad application, 
there are no records available showing that this provision has 
received more than “limited exercise.”48 
4. Sanctions 
The end result of a substantiated allegation that a unit or 
individual committed a gross violation of human rights is that the 
security forces unit will no longer be eligible for U.S. assistance, 
training, or equipment.  In practice, this ineligibility is referred to as 
                                                
OPERATIONS AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND (2019); SPECIAL INSPECTOR 
GEN. FOR AFG. RECONSTRUCTION, SIGAR 17-47-IP CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT IN 
AFGHANISTAN: IMPLEMENTATION OF LEAHY LAWS AND REPORTS OF ASSAULT BY 
AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/inspections/SIGAR%2017-47-IP.pdf [hereinafter 
SIGAR 17-47-IP]. 
46  § 8057, 128 Stat. 5 (emphasis added). 
47 From their website, “CSTC-A trains, advises, and assists within 
Afghan security institutions to develop resource management capability, 
Inspector General and rule of law capability, and provides resources in accordance 
with the Afghan National Defense Security Forces requirements while ensuring 
fiscal oversight and accountability of funds and materiel delivered. CSTC-A is 
focused on helping Afghanistan develop a sustainable, effective and affordable 
ANDSF in support of the Afghan Government.” Resolute Support Afghanistan, 
N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., http://www.rs.nato.int/rs-commands/combined-
security-transition-command-afghanistan.aspx.  
48 DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 14. 
13
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being “Leahy-barred” or receiving “Leahy-sanctions.”  These 
sanctions remain in place unless an exception is used or the unit is 
able to remediate itself.49 
5. Leahy Vetting 
The final piece of the Leahy Law involves a process which 
has come to be known as “Leahy Vetting.”  After a unit has been 
Leahy barred, it is entered into a Department of State database 
known as “International Vetting and Security Tracking” or 
INVEST.50  Then, whenever an organization is planning to request 
support or training for a foreign unit, they will submit a list of the 
individuals set to receive training to be “vetted.”51  The vetting 
process involves a background check, records search, and 
certification before any unit or individual is allowed to receive U.S. 
support. 52  If the unit or individuals are cleared, they may receive 
training, if not, they will be turned away and the training or other 
assistance will be prohibited, ending the Leahy process. 
B. The History of Leahy 
1. Precursors to Leahy 
The legislative history that ended in the passing of the 
modern Leahy amendments began in the 1970s.  Congress wanted 
to apply increased pressure to respect human rights on countries that 
were receiving U.S. security assistance.53  At first, these laws were 
small attachments to legislation that addressed specific countries 
and emplaced specific conditions on the receipt of support.54  These 
developed into a more expansive version of the requirement known 
as “Section 502B” which was a reference to Section 502B of the 
                                                
49 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, supra note 32, at 9. 
50 SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 24, at 10. 
51 Id.  
52 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-793, SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
BETTER HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEWS AND STRATEGIC PLANNING NEEDED FOR U.S. 
ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES 8 (2005), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247336.pdf. 
53 SERAFINO, ET AL., supra note 26, at 11–12. 
54 Id. at 14. 
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FAA.  Section 502B prohibited any funding from being provided to 
a country found to be engaging in a “consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights.”55  However, 
this proto-Leahy suffered from its breadth; according the 
Congressional Research Service, the Department of State never 
invoked Section 502B to refuse funding because it was “overly 
broad.”56  
 The next generation of Leahy was a series of counter-
narcotic statutes that aimed to encourage human rights compliance 
in nations that were receiving U.S. support in combating the drug 
trade.57  These laws prevented FY 1998 funds from being provided 
to foreign security forces when there was credible evidence of gross 
violations of human rights.58 
2. Early Leahy Law 
The set of laws that we now know as the Leahy Amendments 
can trace their roots back to the counter-narcotics statutes of the late 
’90s.  In 1998, Congress decided to expand the application of the 
counter-narcotics version of Leahy to all assistance provided to 
foreign nations through Department of State appropriations each 
year.59  Finally, this practice was permanently codified in the FAA,60 
applying to all assistance authorized by the FAA and Arms Export 
and Control Act (AECA) unless exempted through a 
notwithstanding provision.61 
 Congress also decided to apply the Leahy provision to the 
Department of Defense appropriations as well.62  This originally 
prohibited DOD funds to train units of a foreign military or other 
security forces if there was credible information that a member of a 
                                                
55  22 U.S.C § 2304(a)(2) (2014). 
56 SERAFINO, ET AL., supra note 12, at 3. 
57 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-138. 
58  Act of Nov. 6, 2000, Pub. L. No. 429, 114 Stat. 1900. 
59 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, 585, 111 Stat. 2386 (1997). 
60  22 U.S.C. 2378d. (1996). 
61 See infra Section II.A.3. 
62 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub L. No. 105-
262, § 8115, 112 Stat. 2279, 2327 (1998). 
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unit had committed a gross violation of human rights.63  This 
original version differed from the FAA in that it only applied to 
training, not to other forms of assistance as was prohibited in the 
Department of State version of the law.64  From that point on, both 
Department of Defense and State appropriations were permanently 
subject to Leahy vetting. 
3. Leahy Amendment and Expansion 
Over the past 20 years, there have been a number of changes 
to the Leahy Law’s provisions which range in effect.  Early changes 
to the DoD version removed language about “members” of units to 
clarify that the law was intended to be applied to the entirety of a 
tainted unit.65  In 2013, the words “or police” were added.66 
 In 2011, Congress took steps to better align the DoD and 
DoS versions of the law by clarifying that the requirement applied 
when there was “a gross violation” as opposed to “gross 
violations.”67  Secondly, the standard to resume aid in the FAA 
version was adjusted to “effective steps” instead of “effective 
measures” to better match the DoD “all necessary steps” standard.68  
Lastly, the standard of proof was changed from “credible evidence” 
to “credible information.”69 
 One of the largest changes to the Defense version took place 
in 2014 when Congress removed one of the major differences with 
the State version and increased application to “any training, 
equipment, or other assistance” for the members of the foreign 
                                                
63 Id. § 8130. 
64 Compare id., 112 Stat. 2279, at 2235 (“any training program”) with 
“none of the funds made available by this act” § 563, 114 Stat. 1900, at 1900A-8.  
65 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub L. No. 106–
79, § 8014, 113 Stat. 1212 (1999). 
66 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, 127 
Stat. 198, 199 (Division C). 
67 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 787, 1181-
82 (2011). 
68 Id. 
69 This change was made to clarify that the information used to 
substantiate a Leahy violation would not necessarily be admissible evidence in a 
court of law. This will be discussed further in Section III of this Article. 
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unit.70  This greatly increased the application of the Leahy Law 
within the DoD and resulted in additional guidance being distributed 
throughout the Armed Forces detailing which authorities were 
affected.71  The 2014 amendment also created new exceptions for 
disaster or humanitarian assistance.72 
C. Summation 
Armed with an understanding of the law as it currently 
functions, and the history and intent behind its development, this 
Article will now turn to an analysis of the law and some of its 
deficiencies and propose changes that can be made to better align 
the law’s effect with its intent. 
III. ISSUE 1: CREDIBLY INFORMED—CLARIFYING THE STANDARD 
OF PROOF IN LEAHY CASES 
As a Leahy practitioner working in a U.S. embassy or 
military headquarters, you are tasked with deciding whether a recent 
allegation of a gross violation of human rights is sufficient to Leahy-
bar the security force unit that supposedly committed it.  The at-
issue unit is critically important to both U.S. and the host-nation’s 
defense strategy and relies heavily on U.S. security assistance, 
funding, and support.  The allegation, made by a well-respected non-
governmental organization (“NGO”), consists of the vague 
statements of a handful of undisclosed sources. You now have to 
decide; does this meet the Leahy standard?  Should the U.S. cease 
all support?  The implications of this decision are huge, but as you 
look at your existing guidance and Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs), you find yourself in an incredibly difficult position; how do 
you make the call?  
 Currently, the standard of proof necessary to substantiate a 
Leahy violation is “credible information” that a gross violation of 
human rights occurred.  However, this wasn’t always the case.  The 
current standard was created in 2011.  Before that, Leahy laws used 
                                                
70 § 8057, 128 Stat. 5, at 118–19. 
71 See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, 
“Implementation of Section 8057(b), DoD Appropriations Act, 2014 (Division C 
of Public Law 113-76) (“the DoD Leahy law”)” Tab B, 5 (Aug. 14, 2014). 
72 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, supra note 39. 
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the standard created in the early counter-narcotic days which 
required “credible evidence” instead.  The change from “evidence” 
to “information” was made to address confusion in the practitioner 
community.  Practitioners were reading the term “evidence” and 
assuming that it invoked the types of evidentiary protections 
afforded in a court proceeding.  This was never the intent of Leahy’s 
drafters.  In a 1999 conference report for the Omnibus Consolidated 
Emergency Supplemental, the conferees clarified that “by ‘credible 
evidence’ [we] do not intend that the evidence must be admissible 
in a court of law.”73  The term “evidence” was never intended to be 
used in the same sense as the Federal Rules of Evidence, but that 
intent was lost on many practitioners. 
Practitioners continued to assume evidentiary considerations 
existed in the law.  Perhaps due to the appearance of evidence law 
in Leahy determinations, Congress acted to cure the confusion.  In 
2012 the term “evidence” was removed and replaced with the 
modern standard: “credible information.”  The rationale for this 
change was explicitly stated in the conference report for the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012: “[The Act] substituted 
‘credible information’ for ‘credible evidence’ in order to clarify that 
the information need not be admissible in a court of law to be 
credible and to conform to similar wording in a comparable 
provision74  in  the Defense Appropriations Act.”75 
A. What is the Standard? 
With the 2012 amendment, the problem of deciphering 
“evidence” was solved.  It is likely that those drafting the amendment 
believed there would no longer be any problem in deciphering the 
standard of proof in Leahy cases.  “Credible information,” the new 
standard, would make it easier for practitioners to make more uniform, 
predictable determinations.  Yet despite Congress’s good intentions, 
                                                
73  Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-825, 
at 1168 (1999). 
74 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-
262, 112 Stat. 2279 (1998). The Department of Defense version has had the 
“credible information” standard since its inception in 1999.  
75  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 
786 (2012); H.R. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 112-331, at 1355 (2012).  
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there remained a glaring issue, no one has any idea what “credible 
information” actually means.  
In a 2017 RAND Corporation study, a number of interviews 
were conducted with DoD and DoS Leahy practitioners to acquire a 
more precise picture of how Leahy functions in the field.76  One of the 
concerns documented in the report was that many of the interviewees 
were unsure how to determine the meaning of “credible 
information.”77  There is no official Department of Defense definition 
for the term in law or in any supplemental guidance that has been 
released.78  The DoS has recently released guidance which includes a 
definition of the term,79 but practitioners continually express 
confusion and the DoD has expressly stated that it will not use the 
same definition provided by DoS.80  The RAND study found that out 
of 16 DoS Leahy vetting Standard Operating Procedures (“SOPs”) 
they collected, only one included a definition.81 One interviewee 
requested clarification from the Department of State headquarters, and 
was told it was up to the post to decide the meaning.82  Interviewees 
reported significant differences between their interpretation of the 
standard, and the interpretation used at the DoS headquarters.83  
The Department of Defense Inspector General (“DODIG”), 
found the same thing; there is no formal standard.  In a November 
2017 report,84 DODIG interviewed one official, who stated, “the 
credibility of information is determined on a case-by-case basis and 
                                                
76 See generally MICHAEL J. MCNERNEY, ET AL., IMPROVING 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEAHY LAW (2017) 
[hereinafter RAND] (discussing the vetting processes and methodology for Leahy 
practitioners). 
77 Id. at 39. 
78 DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 53. 
79 Id. at 54. The DoS interprets “credible information” to mean 
“information that is sufficiently believable that a reasonable person would rely on 
such information in their decision-making process. The application of the standard 
does not require a fact finder actually to conclude that a security force has 
committed a GVHR. The term ‘credible information’. . . is a low evidentiary 
standard.” Id. at 53–54 (quoting the DOS “2017 Leahy Vetting Guide; A Guide 
to Implementation and Best Practices”). 
80 Id. 
81 RAND, supra note 76, at 39. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 55. 
19
518 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:2 
the knowledge of doing so is gained through doing the job and having 
experience.”  Another official called the standard “very subjective.”  
According to the DODIG report, the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (“OUSD(P)”), the office responsible for managing 
the DoD’s Leahy portfolio, was “unable to articulate the methodology 
used…to determine whether the information was credible.  They 
simply stated that [representatives] always reach a consensus and that 
it was a judgement call decided on a case-by-case basis.”85  DODIG 
concluded that “there is no record of the reasoning behind any credible 
information determinations, and there is no specific guidance or 
criteria for making these decisions… As a result, there is a risk of 
inconsistency, and the OUSD(P)’s process could be deficient in 
identifying credible information to comply with DoD Leahy Law.”86 
In addition to issues defining the standard, there is also great 
concern with the reliability of the information that is actually used.87  
The reliability of source information was an issue that came up 
multiple times in the RAND study.88  One DoS official noted that the 
evidentiary threshold for credible information was relatively low but 
that information from questionable sources was weighed and valued 
differently at different stages of the vetting process.89  One interviewee 
described a “hierarchy of information sources” wherein he weighed 
“official reporting as ‘reliable,’ other media as ‘mixed,’ and social 
media as ‘very fuzzy90.’”91 The RAND study concluded the discussion 
on the topic by stating: “[s]takeholders perceived final determinations 
on information credibility to be opaque and inconsistent.  This was 
frustrating not only for DoD officials implementing assistance 
programs but also for partners themselves.  As one [Combatant 
Command] official noted: “Failure to apply appropriate rigor to 
adjudication prior to the suspension of assistance may negatively 
impact bilateral relationships and partner nation willingness to 
                                                
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 56. 
87 RAND, supra note 76, at 40. 
88 See generally RAND supra note 77. 
89 Id. at 40. 
90 “Very fuzzy” is an academically nebulous standard that caused the 
author much grief during his tenure in law school. 
91 RAND, supra note 76, at 39–40. 
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investigate and address legitimate allegations.”92 
Clearly, the standard used in Leahy cases, “credible 
information,” is vague, often misunderstood, and subject to disparate 
treatment.  This is an obvious impediment to practitioner confidence 
and uniform application of a standard across the Federal Government, 
but the problem extends even further. 
B. Effects of Poor Interpretation 
As detailed above, there are abundant difficulties in assessing 
what information should be relied upon in making credibility 
determinations, and how to properly weigh them.  Without clarity, 
there is a high probability that determinations can be overly narrow or 
overly broad and ultimately affect units that have done nothing wrong.  
The study conducted by the RAND Corporation uncovered a number 
of cautionary tales that clearly illustrate this concern.93  In one 
situation, a well-known human rights advocacy organization made 
allegations that a partner nation security force had committed gross 
violations of human rights.94  The local Leahy-vetting officials at the 
embassy were able to work extensively with the partner nation and 
other NGOs in the area to provide enough background information to 
refute the allegations; but without extensive efforts by the embassy 
staff, that unit could have been barred from U.S. assistance based on 
false information.95  It is easy to see how this can be a problem for 
U.S. bilateral relations; just one false report from an NGO and the U.S. 
completely shuts down security assistance.  Guilty until proven 
innocent. 
 It can also be difficult to explain the Leahy process to partner 
nations.  “Too often, partners see Leahy merely as a bureaucratic 
impediment and have little understanding of their role in creating a 
smooth process.”96  This is exasperated by the relatively amorphous 
nature of the “credible information” standard.  To many partner 
nations, this can simply look like a convoluted way of disguising 
capricious intent on the part of the United States.  A disgruntled partner 
                                                
92 Id. at 40. 
93 Id. at 40, 58–61. 
94 Id. at 40–41. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 60. 
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nation may believe: “The U.S. doesn’t want to support us so they came 
up with this nonsense to justify their actions.” 
C. Difficulties of Interpretation 
The previous section detailed an example of false information 
being relied upon in Leahy vetting.  This is a problem that has been 
documented in multiple countries and with multiple partner nations.97  
It is not, however, the only example of over-breath in application.  
There have also been allegations that some of the “derogatory 
information” relied upon in Leahy-vetting credibility determinations 
had nothing to do with human rights abuses.  The RAND Corporation 
study found incidents of units being Leahy-barred due to an individual 
having a driving under the influence charge.98  These are all indicative 
of a larger issue, the “credible information” standard is hard to apply 
to real cases.  
 One example of this difficulty was experienced by the author 
during a recent deployment to Afghanistan.  In April of 2017, The 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (“UNAMA”) 
released a report on the treatment of conflict-related detainees.99  The 
report consists of interviews conducted with 469 conflict-related 
detainees in 62 detention facilities in 29 provinces across 
Afghanistan.100  It concluded that 39 percent of detainees gave 
“credible and reliable accounts of having experienced torture or other 
forms of inhuman or degrading treatment whilst in the custody of [the 
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)].”101 Clearly, 
this is unacceptable, and if true, it constitutes the precise type of human 
rights abuses that Leahy aims to address. This would have been a 
perfect time to invoke Leahy if not for a single serious problem, the 
report didn’t provide any information about the actual incidents. In 
                                                
97 Id. at 40–41. 
98 Id. at 41. 
99 See generally U.N., Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees: 
Implementation of Afghanistan’s National Plan on the Elimination of Torture 
(2017), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/treatment_of_conflict-
related_detainees_24_april_2017.pdf [hereinafter UNAMA] (discussing the 
human rights situation in Afghanistan with respects to conflict-related detainees). 
100 Id. at 6. 
101 Id. at 7. 
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reading the report, there are broad references to a number of torture-
related incidents taking place by organizations in certain areas,102 but 
the particulars of specific cases were never released.  
This creates a frustrating Leahy-vetting issue: Did these 
reports constitute “credible information” of gross violations of human 
rights committed by the units in these areas?  Potentially.  There was 
enough information to identify the area and organization that was 
responsible, but there was no information about the specific incidents 
of torture.  In trusting the highly-respected United Nations agency, the 
U.S. could make a credibility determination on the word of the 
UNAMA report alone, but there would still be an overbreadth 
problem.  If only one police station, military unit, or other organization 
was at fault, it would be unnecessarily damaging to the Afghan 
National Security and U.S.-Afghan relations to Leahy-bar entire 
swaths of units based on the report.  And there remained the issue of 
whether these incidents, if examined individually by U.S. personnel, 
would meet the Leahy standard.  It is no wonder then, that the DoD 
and DoS came to opposite conclusions in this case.  The DoS chose to 
believe UNAMA and find the allegations credible while the DoD 
stated that “in order to consider that information credible, it would 
need a corroborating source or additional evidence from UNAMA, 
beyond the statement in its report.”103 
 This issue is compounded when incidents receive national 
attention.  In July 2017, an article was released in The Washington 
Post entitled, “Afghan soldiers are using boys as sex slaves, and the 
U.S. is looking the other way.”104  The article details the author’s 
experience with an unnamed Afghan police commander showing off 
his prized Bacha Bazi boy.  Bacha Bazi is a terrible practice that exists 
in some parts of Afghanistan involving wealthy men “acquiring” 
                                                
102 Id. at 37. For example, the report details that of the 22 reports of 
torture at the hands of the Afghan Local Police, seven victims reported being 
beaten on arrest by ALP in Nangarhar province, five by ALP in Baghlan, two by 
ALP in Kunduz, and one each by ALP in Badakhshan, Balkh, Faryab, Kunar, 
Laghman, Paktika, Paktiya, Sar-e-Pul and Takhar.  
103 DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 55. 
 104 Anuj Chopra, Afghan Soldiers are Using Boys as Sex Slaves, and the 
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dancing slave boys and forcing them to dance for their guests, and 
occasionally perform sexual favors.105  The practice has been 
condemned by the United Nations106 and is also clearly the type of 
behavior that should invoke Leahy.  The Washington Post article 
criticizes the U.S. for not doing enough to stop the practice and even 
invokes the Leahy Law by name: “turning a blind eye to crimes such 
as Bacha Bazi amounts to a serious contravention of America’s Leahy 
amendment, which bans U.S. assistance or training to foreign military 
units that fail to honor basic human rights.”107  The article, which 
garnered hundreds of comments and thousands of shares on social 
media, presented difficulties for Leahy practitioners: despite the 
overwhelming pressure to respond to the incident detailed in the 
article, how do you address it without more specific information?  
And, if you don’t invoke Leahy, what ground can you stand on when 
responding to the public outcry? 
 Without a clearly defined standard of proof, or review, it is 
difficult to provide a clear answer about the “correct” actions in any of 
these cases.  The U.S. risks damaging relationships and tainting 
innocent units if it applies the standard too broadly, and risks failing 
the “front page test” in the Washington Post for not applying the 
standard strictly enough.  Further, in either instance, there is not a lot 
of legal ground to stand on in justifying the position.  The practitioners 
cannot point to the “credible information” standard for explanation 
because the standard is poorly understood and too inconsistently 
applied.  The solution, then, is to change the standard to something 
that can more easily be understood and applied by practitioners, and 
better explain decisions to the press, partner nations, and the American 
public.  Which brings us to the first suggested change presented by this 
Article: change “credible information” to “probable cause.” 
D. Probable Cause 
“Of the amounts made available to the Department of 
Defense, none may be used for any training, equipment, or 
                                                
105 Id. 
106 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on 
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, U.N. Doc. S/2019/280 (Apr. 15, 2017), 
https://undocs.org/en/S/2019/280. 
107 Chopra, supra note 105. 
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other assistance for a unit of a foreign security force if the 
Secretary of Defense has probable cause to believe that the 
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” 
The solution proposed by this Article is to change the 
standard of proof in Leahy to mirror an established legal standard 
from elsewhere in American jurisprudence. There are two primary 
benefits to this approach.  First, you provide the practitioner 
community, partner nations, and the American public, with a 
familiar requirement that has been analyzed and scrutinized in 
countless cases over the course of the last 200 years.  Second, you 
provide practitioners with the entirety of American jurisprudence to 
assist them when difficult cases emerge. 
The justification provided above could support the use of 
any established legal standard from “reasonable suspicion” through 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The decision about which standard to 
choose is subject to debate, and ultimately comes down to a policy 
decision to be made by Congress.  However, given what we know 
about the original intent of Leahy, this Article believes that 
“probable cause” would be best.  Upon first glance, it appears to be 
the closest in effect to “credible information,” and it is a standard 
that should be very familiar to legal experts and laymen alike.  For 
the sake of ease and demonstration, the following analysis will 
assume probable cause is selected as the new standard and then 
better explain why, although others may be viable, it is the proper 
choice. 
1. In Favor of an Established Standard 
As stated above, there are two primary reasons to support a 
change from “credible information” to a more established standard 
of proof in Leahy cases.  The first is the familiarity of the standard, 
and the second is the ease of application. Turning back to the study 
conducted by the RAND Corporation, practitioners repeatedly 
expressed their concerns with the actual degree of scrutiny being 
applied, the degree of credibility and hierarchy to assign information 
sources, and the amount of information necessary to substantiate an 
allegation.108  These issues all disappear when the law is changed 
                                                
108 See generally RAND, supra note 76 (explaining how the United 
States can better identify and punish human rights violators).  
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from “credible information” to “probable cause.”  Probable cause 
has been defined in a number of different ways, but for the sake of 
this Article, we will use the definition set forth by the Supreme Court 
(with a few adjustments to better suit our subject matter): “where the 
facts and circumstances within the [deciding official’s] knowledge, 
and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a person of reasonable 
caution that a [gross violation of human rights] has been 
committed.”109 
Familiarity, the first benefit, is something that can be 
realized immediately and simply by the implementation of the 
change.  Knowing that there is established standard will likely 
increase a practitioner’s faith that the Leahy standard is being 
enforced uniformly.  This in turn will allow them to focus on a fair 
application, rather than feeling tempted to warp the standard to fit 
what they believe to be a proper outcome as determined by political 
or public demand.  
This standard would also sound better when explained to the 
American public or partner nations.  Without a well-established 
standard of proof, it may appear to some that there is no standard at 
all.  “Credible information” as officially defined by Leahy vetting 
SOPs can very easily be confused with “credible information” in the 
common sense: information that someone, somewhere, found 
credible, for some reason.  In contrast, announcing that “there was 
insufficient information to establish probable cause that a unit 
engaged in violations of human rights” carries with it a weight that 
the public has ascribed to the well-known standard of probable 
cause.110 
Far more importantly than appearances and familiarity, it 
will actually work better.  This brings us to the second reason to 
support a change to an established legal standard: ease of 
application.  Over the course of American history, there have been 
hundreds of court cases that have interpreted the probable cause 
standard as it applies to different situations.  Practitioners, armed 
with this expansive jurisprudence, will be far better equipped to 
                                                
109 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
110 This is independent of whether they understand the actual standard. 
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make credibility determinations.  In order to demonstrate how this 
could work, we will first need to indulge a brief history lesson. 
In the preeminent cases of United States v. Spinelli111 and 
Aguilar v. Texas,112 the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with 
determining whether there was probable cause when warrants were 
heavily based on the statements of confidential informants.113  In 
Aguilar they held that there was no probable cause to search when 
the only information supporting a warrant was an affidavit of police 
officers who swore that they had “received reliable information 
form a credible person and do believe” that narcotics were 
present.114  The court held that there was insufficient information to 
allow the magistrate who issued the warrant to determine the 
credibility of the informants statements and that “the magistrate 
must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on 
by the person providing the information and some of the underlying 
circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant, 
whose identity was not disclosed, was credible or his information 
reliable.”115  The Court in Spinelli further clarified that the 
magistrate must be informed of the “underlying circumstances from 
which the informant had concluded” that a crime was committed.116  
The result of these cases came to be known as the Aguilar-Spinelli 
test, that probable cause cannot be established on the basis of a 
confidential informant without facts showing that (1) the informant 
is reliable and credible and (2) establishing some of the underlying 
circumstances relied upon by the person providing the 
information.117 
The two-prong test was later overruled in favor of a totality-
of-the circumstances approach in Illinois v. Gates,118 but the 
“veracity” and “basis of knowledge” factors are still considered to 
                                                
111 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 410 (1969). 
112 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
113 Id. at 109.  
114 Id. at 115. 
115 Id. at 114.  
116 Spinelli, supra note 111, at 417.  
117 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983) (explaining the 
standard as a “two-prong test” before overruling it in favor of a totality of the 
circumstances test). 
118 Id.  at 213.  
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be relevant considerations in the determination of probable cause,119 
and some states still use the test for probable cause determinations 
under their own constitutions.120 
Now, given the quick guidance from these cases and our new 
definition, one can make a determination in the Leahy context.  
Focus on the UNAMA report from earlier that contained allegations 
that members of the Afghan Local Police had been torturing 
detainees.  Under the totality of the circumstances, are the facts and 
circumstances, as known to the deciding official, sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a belief by a person of reasonable caution that 
a gross violation of human rights has been committed?121  
On first thought, one may believe that there is obviously 
enough to meet the standard.  After all, UNAMA, an agent of the 
United Nations, said that it happened.  However, upon further 
reflection a practitioner may ask: where did they get their 
information?  In this case, the source of the information was from 
undisclosed combat-related detainees;122 which could just as easily 
be called confidential criminal informants.  The Leahy practitioner 
should not be attempting to determine UNAMA’s credibility any 
more than a court would focus on the credibility of a police affiant.  
Instead, the practitioner should focus on the credibility of the 
informants UNAMA interviewed.  So, what is known about them?  
If one were to apply what he’s learned of Aguilar and 
Spinelli, he may ask: what can be said about the veracity of the 
source?  In this case, nothing.  There is no information available 
about the individual answering UNAMA’s questions, their 
reliability, or their credibility.   UNAMA says they are credible, but 
that is no different than the police officers in Aguilar and their 
warrant based on “reliable information from a credible person.”123  
What about the second prong, the basis of knowledge for the 
information?  The practitioner knows that the detainees are 
experiencing what they perceive to be torture, but nothing of the 
                                                
119 Id. 
120 See generally Commonwealth v. Banville, 457 Mass. 530 (2010); 
People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 424–26 (1985). 
121 This is the standard definition in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160 (1949), adjusted to fit the context of this example. 
122 See generally UNAMA, supra note 99. 
123 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109. 
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underlying circumstances, what has been done to them, who is doing 
it, or in what fashion it was done.  This is almost identical to the 
situation in Aguilar, wherein the magistrate had no information 
about the basis for the informant’s knowledge.  As such, a Leahy 
practitioner can come to the conclusion that these incidents do not 
establish probable cause.  
In doing so, he can demonstrate his reasoning based on 
established case law, and provide others a basis for challenging his 
decision with further legal analysis.  The rationale for his 
determination can be held out to the public, to Congress, and to the 
partner nation, and demonstrate consistency in application of the 
law. 
2. In Favor of Probable Cause 
Neither of the two reasons to move away from “credible 
information” would be affected if the standard of proof applied was 
“clear and convincing evidence,” “reasonable suspicion,” or any 
other established standard of proof.  The analysis and the case law 
would change, the definitions would change, but the rationale would 
remain.  You’d still provide practitioners, the public, and partner-
nations with a more easily understandable, and more familiar 
standard, and you’d still arm decision makers with a well-developed 
jurisprudence to inform their decisions.  Yet despite the fact that 
other standards may work, it is the opinion of this Article that 
probable cause works best, and most closely resembles the intent of 
Leahy’s existing “credible information” standard. 
One thing that has been made clear is that the original intent 
for the Leahy standard of proof was that the information it was based 
on did not have to be admissible in court;124 that it did not need to 
be admissible “evidence.”  Probable cause meets this criterion. 
Information does not need to meet the requirements of admissibility 
in a court in order to be used in a probable cause determination.  As 
discussed above, information from confidential informants, which 
would be barred from admission in court due to the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation,125 is permissible when 
                                                
124 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 112-331 (2011) (Conf. Rep.). 
125  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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determining probable cause.126  The same is true with hearsay 
evidence, which can be used as the basis probable cause when 
obtaining a warrant.127  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
expressly state that at preliminary hearings, in which magistrates 
determine probable cause, the defendant is not allowed to “object to 
evidence on the ground that it was unlawfully acquired.”128  
Privileged evidence is also often relied upon in Probable Cause 
hearings as evidenced by a number of cases where probable cause 
was determined by the statements of a spouse, seemingly in 
violation of spousal privileges.129  The law in this area is best 
summed up by Justice Black in addressing whether the of rules of 
evidence should apply in Grand Jury proceedings: “It would run 
counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, in which 
laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules. Neither 
justice nor the concept of a fair trial requires such a change.”130  
Probable cause meets Leahy’s intent and quashes the fear that the 
U.S. would continue to fund human rights abusers due to the tyranny 
of such “technical rules.”  As such, it is the ideal choice.131 
E. Summation 
The current standard of proof in Leahy vetting is confusing, 
poorly applied, and subject to an inappropriate degree of subjective 
                                                
126  Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 113; see Peterson v. California, 604 F.3d 1166, 
1169 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Confrontation Clause does not apply to 
preliminary hearings). 
127 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (overruled on 
other grounds) (“We conclude, therefore, that hearsay may be the basis for a 
warrant.”); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (holding that 
Grand Jury proceedings do not require competent evidence to satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment). 
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1. 
129 See, e.g., United States v. Beaver, 99 (1929); People v. Bladek, 259 
Ill. 69 (1913). 
130 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956). 
131 As stated earlier, this is ultimately a policy decision. The higher the 
standard, the fewer cases will result in Leahy sanctions. Congress needs to decide 
whether the intent is to incentivize compliance or make absolutely certain U.S. 
money stays out of the hands of offenders. In order to make a fully informed 
decision, stakeholders should analyze the effects of different legal standards and 
the resulting degree of impact.  
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interpretation.  This causes great difficulties for the practitioner 
community, and risks U.S. relations with partner nations.  In order 
to improve application of the Leahy laws, and to further its intent, 
the standard should be changed from “credible information” to 
“probable cause.”  Changing to an existing and recognized legal 
standard provides Leahy practitioners with the benefit of American 
jurisprudence, and the guidance that it offers, and it lends more 
legitimacy to the Leahy-vetting process.  Once the decision to 
switch to an established standard is made, probable cause is the best 
choice.  It meets the intent of Leahy’s drafters and as such, would 
likely strike the desirable balance between reliability of information 
and protection against over-application of Leahy sanctions. 
IV. ISSUE 2: CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND THE DUAL PURPOSES 
OF LEAHY 
During a classified briefing, you learn that U.S. assets have 
observed members of a well-known partner security force unit 
engaging in clear violations of human rights.  Torture, extra-judicial 
killings, rape, and other offenses are being clearly displayed on a 
screen in front of you.  You know immediately that Leahy needs to be 
invoked, any standard of proof would be satisfied.  After submitting 
the necessary reports, and moving through the required processes, the 
commander of the at-issue partner nation security forces unit requests 
support and assistance. What do you tell him?  What can you tell him? 
All the details of the incident are classified.  You explain to the 
commander that the U.S. is immediately terminating all support for his 
unit but you cannot tell him why.  You cannot tell him anything about 
the incident, or what the unit can do to correct the issues.  He is Leahy-
barred, and despite his desire to cooperate and bring the wrong-doers 
to justice, he is prohibited from learning a single detail of the violations 
that occurred.  The unit is now combat ineffective, it is unable to 
support itself without U.S. security assistance funds, relations with the 
unit, commander, and the partner nation have taken a colossal blow, 
and arguably worst of all, the perpetrators cannot be prosecuted, 
remaining free to commit additional violations in the future.  
 The problem detailed above stems from an internal 
contradiction in what we will later define to as the “dual purposes” of 
the Leahy law: (1) preventing U.S. taxpayer dollars from going to 
human rights abusers; and (2) incentivizing partner nations to respect 
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human rights and hold violators accountable.132  Both are highly 
admirable and, in most cases, they can both be satisfied through the 
law’s invocation.  However, there can be cases in which the dual 
purposes fall into conflict with one another.  In these cases, such as the 
scenario at the beginning of this section, the U.S. government can only 
accomplish one of the two.  This is frequently the case when the basis 
of the credibility determination is classified.  In these cases, there can 
be no incentivizing effect as partner nations are prohibited from 
knowing why their support is being withheld.  Which brings us to the 
second proposed change to the law, in those situations where the dual 
purposes conflict, decision makers need the flexibility to decide which 
purpose is most important. 
A. The Dual Purposes of Leahy 
 During his 2015 remarks to the U.S. Institute of Peace, Senator 
Patrick Leahy, the namesake of the Leahy law, discussed the purpose 
for which the law was created.  “The Leahy Law is narrowly focused, 
and it has two distinct but complementary purposes: to shield our 
country from complicity in gross violations of human rights; and to 
encourage and assist foreign governments in bringing to justice 
members of their security forces when those crimes occur.”133  These 
“distinct but complimentary purposes”134 are what this Article refers 
to as the dual purposes of Leahy.  
The first of these dual purposes, which this Article will refer 
to as “purity,” is to shield the U.S. from complicity in gross violations 
of human rights.  According to Senator Leahy, “[w]hen our partners 
commit abuses we become complicit—or we are perceived to be 
complicit—in the predatory and abusive acts that erode the legitimacy 
of those forces.”135  The U.S. must distance itself from these acts and 
ensure that taxpayer dollars are not being spent in a fashion that is so 
antithetical to American values.  In effect, ensuring that the U.S. 
                                                
132 Linwood Ham, Human Rights Violations: U.S. Foreign Aid for 
Accountability and Prevention with U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy’s Remarks, U.S. 





135 Id.  
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remains pure and untainted by complicity in human rights violations.   
The second of the dual purposes, which will be referred to as 
“incentive,” is to encourage and assist foreign governments in holding 
violators accountable and developing systems to prevent abuses from 
occurring in the first place.  This incentive has both punitive, and 
aspirational ends.  It is punitive because security forces that commit 
human rights violations need to be held accountable, and responsible 
individuals need to be prosecuted.  In Senator Leahy’s words, we 
mustn’t treat violators as “if they are above the law, but by showing 
that they have to answer to the law.”136  However, the other end is 
aspirational, “the law is punitive . . . But the Law’s larger purpose is 
to build professional, disciplined, transparent and accountable security 
forces who are sustainable and effective partners for the .”137  We don’t 
just want to punish these individuals, units, and nations because they 
deserve to be punished, we want to incentivize them to become better, 
and to hold themselves to a higher standard.138  According to Tom 
Malinowski, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights 
and labor, this incentive is “the whole point of the Leahy Law”;139 to 
make the world a better place. 
B. Dueling, Dual Purposes 
 These “distinct but complementary”140 purposes are both 
commendable, and generally, they can both be accomplished through 
the use of the Leahy law.  Practitioners can ensure that U.S. funds do 
not end up in the hands of human rights abusers, and simultaneously 
use Leahy-sanctions as an incentive to force partner nations to take 
human rights issues more seriously; this would hold individual abusers 
accountable.  The problem is that not all cases are so simple; and, at 
no time is this truer than when classified information is involved.  
When the information that forms the basis for a Leahy 
violation is classified, practitioners cannot share the information with 
                                                
136 Id. (emphasis in original).  
137 Id.  
138 Id. (quoting Tom Malinowski, former Assistant secretary of state for 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor). 
139 Sarah Egozi, Aid is Key to Reform Forces on Rights, Leahy Says, U.S. 
INST. OF PEACE (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/02/aid-
key-reform-local-forces-rights-leahy-says.  
140 Ham, supra note 132. 
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units, commanders, or partner nations.  This doesn’t matter for 
Leahy’s “purity” purpose.  The first of Leahy’s dual purposes is 
indifferent to the offending nation’s degree of understanding, 
knowledge, or ability to address gross violations of human rights.  The 
only concern is that keeps its hands clean, and that taxpayer dollars 
stay out of the pockets of human rights violators.  As such, there is no 
problem fulfilling these purposes by Leahy-barring a unit without 
explaining why. 
The second of the dual purposes is not nearly so apathetic; 
incentives don’t work in secrecy. Without the ability to share 
information with the partner nation or security force, there is no way 
to incentivize them to change. There is no way “to build professional, 
disciplined, transparent, and accountable security forces who are 
sustainable and effective partners for the United States”141 when units 
are immediately cut off with little hope of ever being eligible for future 
support.  “Meanwhile, security Forces are in a ‘catch-22’: they have 
no training to improve tactics and ensure human rights compliance, 
because they have unresolved human rights allegations due to poor 
tactics.”142  Even if there is willingness to take the desired steps, 
without knowledge of the underlying incident, there is little that unit 
or nation can do.  This is no-doubt frustrating and can lead to serious 
consequences in achieving the U.S.’ policy objectives and 
strengthening bilateral relations with partner nations.  As one 
practitioner noted, “[d]enial of training, particularly without a 
comprehensive explanation, is politically sensitive.”143  Politically 
sensitive, indeed. 
In their study, the RAND Corporation spoke with a U.S. 
official with first-hand knowledge of this type of incident.  The 
interviewee explained that “tensions arose with the partner nation after 
a ‘golden boy’ within the military was tied to derogatory information 
and suspended from training.  The embassy was unable to provide 
details, further upsetting high-ranking military officials.”144  This isn’t 
an isolated, or even rare event. This Article’s author witnessed similar 
                                                
141 Ham, supra note 132 (emphasis in original).  
142 Michael J. O’Connor, Bangladesh Rapid Action Battalion: Satisfying 
the Requirements of the Leahy Amendment with a Rule of Law Approach, 215 
MIL. L. Rᴇᴠ. 182, 228 (2013). 
143 MCNERNEY, ET AL., supra note 76, at 46. 
144 Id. 
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instances during his time in Afghanistan.  It is hard enough to explain 
to a partner nation that you are withholding well-needed assistance 
when you can explain the exact rationale, situations and policies at 
play.  Without that explanation, it can set relations back immensely, 
and make partner nations feel abandoned. 
C. The New Rules of the Duel 
 In situations where the “incentive” purpose is frustrated by an 
inability to share information of a violation of human rights, the 
current result is that “purity” will always win.  If a unit cannot ever 
remediate due to an inability to identify the problem, it will be 
permanently banned from receiving U.S. assistance.  In some cases, 
this is the proper result.  There are clearly situations where the 
violations are widespread, egregious and obvious enough, that the 
U.S. must wipe its hands of any involvement, without explanation.  
Yet, no matter how strongly one feels about keeping the U.S. pure, in 
some cases the ability to preserve the relationship, and the combat 
effectiveness of the unit outweighs the consequences. Sometimes, 
purity without incentive is not enough.  In these cases, when the 
“incentive” purpose is frustrated by an inability to share classified 
information, Leahy practitioners need a mechanism to decide whether 
to continue support despite the substantiated violation. 
 This Article recommends the addition of the following new 
provision in both versions of the Leahy law: 
 
(X) UN-DISCLOSABLE BASIS –  
  (1) In the event that all the information used by the Secretary of 
(State/Defense) to establish probable cause to believe that a security force 
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights is un-disclosable to 
the security force unit or parent nation, 
(2) The Secretary of (State/Defense), or his designee145, may decide to 
continue to provide training, equipment, or other assistance, 
  (3) Provided that there is no way to change the un-disclosable status of 
the relied upon information or evidence.  
  (4) In making this determination, the Secretary of (State/Defense), or his 
designee, should consider the following factors: 
                                                
145 The degree to which this may be delegated is subject to a policy 
determination. 
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    (A) The unit’s remediation capability, including the sophistication of 
the unit’s military justice system, or other similar punitive, investigative 
system; 
    (B) The unit or parent nation’s familiarization with the “Leahy Law;” 
    (C)The egregiousness of the incident; 
    (D)The degree of command involvement or condoning of the incident;     
    (E)The sophistication of the security force’s organizational structure; 
and 
    (F)The National Interest of the United States in maintaining the unit’s 
eligibility for security assistance. 
  (5) No later than 15 days after any such decision, the Secretary of 
(State/Defense) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
report . . .146 
  (6) For the purposes of this section “un-disclosable” means that the 
security force or partner nation cannot be provided access to the 
information or evidence used to substantiate a violation because:  
  (A) The classified nature of the information or evidence; 
  (B) The classified nature of the means used to collect the   
        information or evidence; or 
     (C) Another existing written policy. 
 
This new provision will provide the necessary operational 
flexibility to allow the continued support of key units when doing 
so is in the best interests of the U.S.  It will also provide an additional 
tool to use in the maintenance of bilateral relationships between the 
U.S. and a partner nation.  This proposed provision is narrowly 
tailored enough to avoid abuse while still providing a fair degree of 
flexibility.  The remainder of this section will move through the 
proposed provision and explain the rationale for each subdivision. 
1. In the event that all the information . . . is un-
disclosable . . .  
 The first paragraph of the provision clarifies that it can only 
be invoked when all of the information relied upon is un-
                                                
146 The desired substance of these reports is subject to Congressional 
decision. 
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disclosable.  This is important because it prevents the use of the 
provision when there is enough disclosable information to explain 
the reason why a unit is being Leahy-barred.  In situations where 
there is both classified and unclassified information that both points 
to a violation of human rights, the U.S. is able to explain why 
security assistance is being withheld and therefore there is no 
conflict between the dual purposes of Leahy. 
 The use of the term “un-disclosable” instead of the more 
specific “classified” allows for greater flexibility in circumstances 
where the information relied upon is not classified, but disclosure is 
unwarranted or prohibited for some other diplomatic, strategic, or 
policy reason.  Including these additional grounds within the 
definition of the term “un-disclosable” ensures the provision isn’t 
too narrowly focused. 
2. Provided that there is no way to change the un-
disclosable status . . . 
 Paragraph three is intended to prevent the use of the 
provision when there is a possibility to change the classification 
level, or reassess the policy reason for withholding information from 
a partner nation.  In the event that a Leahy practitioner can get the 
information declassified, there is no longer justification to use this 
provision. 
3. . . . should consider the following factors . . .  
 The explicit listing of factors provides Leahy practitioners 
with better guidance than using something broader, such as 
“National Interest,” to determine whether use of the provision is 
necessary.  Each factor is selected with Leahy’s dual purposes in 
mind.  The first two factors are focused on the incentive purpose, 
the next two on the purity purpose, and the final two focus on equity 
and the U.S.’ interest in the outcome of the decision. 
The first two factors look at the incentive purpose and 
whether it is truly frustrated.  The first factor considers the 
sophistication of the unit’s ability to address the issue on its own.  If 
a security force has a highly sophisticated military justice system or 
an active criminal investigative agency, it is likely they will be able 
to discover, investigate, and adjudicate the incident on their own.  
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The more likely it is the security force will take remediating 
measures without U.S. assistance, the less justified the use of this 
provision.  Essentially, units that are self-motivated do not need 
incentives from the U.S.  The second factor focuses on the security 
force’s familiarity with the Leahy Law.  The better a security force 
is familiarized, the easier it will be for them to realize the types of 
things they need to do to address the underlying incident without 
U.S. assistance. 
The third and fourth factors focus on the violations 
themselves.  These two factors are intended to represent the purity 
purpose of Leahy, the more egregious the violation, and the more 
direct the chain of command involvement, the more important it is 
to keep the U.S. away and untainted.  If an entire nation’s armed 
forces are riddled with human rights abusers at the highest levels of 
command, there is little to be gained by continuing a relationship 
with a single offending unit.  In these cases, a more holistic, national 
strategy is likely necessary.  In comparison, a single individual’s 
actions should not be the basis for loss of support to the entire unit, 
especially if the unit would be likely to address the incident if they 
knew it occurred.  Furthermore, the more egregious an incident, the 
more likely the security force will uncover it on their own, or receive 
information from another source.  
 The fifth and sixth factors are focused on the U.S.’ interest.  
The fifth factor considers the sophistication of the organizational 
structure. As discussed at the beginning of this Article,147 when an 
individual commits a violation of human rights, he and his unit 
become Leahy-barred.  The more sophisticated the organization’s 
structure, the better the U.S. is able to minimize the impact of a 
single violation.  If it can be isolated to a single company, or platoon 
sized element,148 it will allow continued security assistance to the 
vast majority of non-offending units.  If, however, there are poor 
distinctions between units, a Leahy violation will likely taint a far 
larger group of individuals which may have a more dramatic impact 
                                                
147 See supra Section II. 
148 See generally, Michael Moran, Modern Military Force Structure, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (OCT. 26, 2006), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modern-military-force-structures. In most 
militaries, this sized unit ranges from 20–100 people.  Company, ENCYCLOPÆDIA 
BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/company-military-unit. 
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on bilateral relations and U.S. interests.  The final factor asks the 
decision maker to broadly assess the U.S. national interest.  If there 
is nothing to lose, bilateral relations will not be affected, and there 
is no military effectiveness threatened, there is little reason to use 
this provision. 
D. Summation 
 The Leahy law’s dual purposes are typically able to exist 
together in peace.  However, sometimes they fall into conflict. 
Rather than allowing the law to always choose to serve the purity 
purpose by default, decision makers on the ground should be 
empowered to assess the situation and decide whether it is more 
important to keep the U.S. away from a tainted unit, or to continue 
developing and working with the unit to make them a stronger future 
partner and promote a stronger relationship with partner nations.  In 
making this decision, precautions should be taken to prevent abuse 
but also provide enough flexibility to ensure that Leahy is being 
used as effectively as possible to promote the U.S. National Interest 
and the international development of human rights policy. 
 
 
V. ISSUE 3: STATELY LANGUAGE—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
DOS AND DOD VERSIONS OF LEAHY 
 
In the preceding sections of this Article, there have been 
multiple references to the differences that exist between the DoD and 
DoS version of the law.  The primary differences149 are: (1) The 
remediation standard; (2) The DoS duty to notify and assist; and (3) 
DoD’s “extraordinary circumstances,” disaster relief, humanitarian 
aid, and national security exceptions.150  Clearly, there must be an 
important reason to differentiate between the standards applied to the 
Secretaries of State and Defense, otherwise, why further complicate 
                                                
149 There are other obvious differences between the two versions such as 
substituting the names of agencies, the names of the appropriations, the specific 
grammatical structure used, but the three identified are the only sections that could 
conceivably have material impacts on interpretation. 
150 SERAFINO, ET AL., supra note 26, at 5.  
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and already complicated law with additional layers of ambiguity?  It 
is true that there are important differences between the Departments 
of State and Defense, both in structure and in mission, but these 
differences don’t account for all the discrepancies between the two 
versions of the law.  Additionally, as the mission of the two 
departments overlaps, as has large become the case in Afghanistan and 
other modern conflicts, any justification in keeping the standards 
different is increasingly weakened.  As such, there is no longer a 
reason to maintain many of the differences in the laws which is why 
this Article’s third recommendation is to remove the unnecessary 
differences. 
A. Remediation Standard 
As explained earlier, remediation is the process by which a 
previously Leahy-barred unit is able to regain access to U.S. funding 
and support.  The standard for remediation is different depending on 
the version of the Leahy law.  The Department of Defense version 
requires that a security force remain barred “unless all necessary 
corrective steps have been taken.”151  The Department of State version 
applies when the Secretary of State “determines and reports” to 
Congress “that the government of such country is taking effective steps 
to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to 
justice.”152  Neither version expressly defines what “all necessary 
steps” nor “effective steps” would entail.  To date, Congress has not 
provided any information explaining a rationale for keeping them 
separate. 
The intent has always been that the two be treated as a single 
standard. In a letter sent from Senator Leahy to then Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen in 1999, the Senator admitted that the DoS 
and DoD Standards were intended to be the same.153  In practice, the 
Department of Defense and Department of State have agreed.  The two 
Departments treat the standards as if they were the identical.154  In a 
                                                
151 10 U.S.C. § 362 (emphasis added). 
152 22 U.S.C § 2378(d) (emphasis added). 
153 SERAFINO, ET AL., supra note 26, at 17 (quoting a letter from Senator 
Patrick Leahy to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, January 14, 1999, provided 
to CRS by the Senator’s staff).  
154 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, supra note 32, at 3. 
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2015 memorandum issued by Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, 
Secretaries of the Military Departments were told that the term 
‘appropriate remediation measures’ would be used when describing 
the measures necessary for a security forces unit to be remediated.  
Military Departments were explicitly told that the new term should be 
read to mean ‘all necessary corrective steps’ for purposes of the DoD 
Leahy law, and ‘effective steps’ for purposes of the DOS Leahy 
law.”155  In effect, the memo erased the difference between the two 
versions of the law as a matter of practice.  
There are also good policy reasons to unify the language.  In a 
law as complex as Leahy, and as potentially burdensome, there are 
always going to be risks that individuals or organizations try to avoid 
its effects.  Allowing separate language gives lip-service to the 
argument that the standards were intended to mean different things and 
as neither standard has ever been expressly defined, an alternative 
interpretation could be defended.  One example of this occurred in the 
early days of the law. Despite Senator Leahy’s clarification letter sent 
to Secretary Cohen in 1999, the Secretary disagreed.  He felt that the 
law could be interpreted in a different way.  Cohen wanted to interpret 
the law to allow a unit to fulfill remediation requirements by simply 
removing an identified violator or violators from a unit, or by ensuring 
that that unit received law of war or human rights training.156  
Secretary Cohen eventually backed down and, to date, there has never 
been an incident of the Department of Defense using an alternative 
interpretation of the standard to remediate a Leahy-barred unit;157 
however, the opportunity still remains, bolstered by some theories of 
statutory construction.158  Should the Secretary of State or Defense 
disagree with his or her counterpart’s actions, they have a superfluous 
ground to make an argument. 
The primary counterargument to all the differences discussed 
in this section, is that there are real differences between the missions 
                                                
155  Id. 
156 GAO 13-866, supra note 42, at 6. 
157 Id.  
158 Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525 (1987).  “Where 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Id. at 525 
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
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of the Department of Defense and that of the Department of State that 
warrant discrepancies in standards.  Namely, the Department of State’s 
aim is diplomacy while the Department of Defense’s is defense.  
Traditionally, this has been the case.  With that in mind, it would make 
sense that the Department of State, interested in maintaining 
diplomatic ties, teaching foreign nations to improve, and being 
actively involved in security assistance, would only require a few steps 
in the right direction to resume support.  The Department of Defense, 
especially in wartime, has a different role.  It doesn’t have the time to 
track progress, or encourage continued support.  Once a unit is fully 
remediated, that is when “all necessary steps” have been taken, the 
DoD will resume support, until then it has other things to occupy its 
time and resources.  If this were still the case, regardless of Senator 
Leahy’s original intent, there would be a solid justification in 
maintaining the differences.  However, over the course of the last few 
years, that mission distinction is increasingly no longer the case. 159  
The mission of the Department of State and the Department of 
Defense has a great degree of overlap in recent conflicts.160  As an 
example, look no further than the Afghan Security Forces Fund which 
is a direct authorization from Congress for the DoD to engage in 
comprehensive security assistance to the ANSF.161  There is also the 
change in the NATO mission form ISAF’s combat operations to 
Resolute Support’s Train, Advise, Assist (TAA) role.  Perhaps due to 
the instability of the region, or the poor security situation, the DoD has 
taken a much larger role in security assistance.  And if that is to remain 
in the future, it is better to remove the distinctions in Leahy to reflect 
the modern state of affairs. 
For these reasons, and unless the Departments of Defense and 
State move toward their traditional separate missions, there is little 
justification in maintaining the differences in the remediation 
language.  The intent has always been that the two versions be treated 
the same, they are already treated the same as a matter of policy, and 
if allowing differences creates an opportunity to undermine the 
                                                
159 See generally GORDON ADAMS & SHOON MURRAY, MISSION CREEP 
(Gordon Adams & Shoon Murray, eds., 2014).  
160 The overlap in mission set between the two Departments and the 
effects on the Leahy law could easily form the basis for additional research but it 
is far beyond the scope of this Article. 
161 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, supra note 39. 
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purpose of the law, that opportunity should be eliminated.  
B. Duty to Notify and Assist 
The next major difference is that the DoS version of the law 
includes the following duty to notify offending nations: 
 
In the event that funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to this section, the 
Secretary of State shall promptly inform the foreign government of the basis for 
such action and shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assist the foreign 
government in taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the 
security forces to justice.162 
 
The Defense version of the law has no equivalent.163  There is 
no stated reason why the State version has this provision and the 
Defense version does not.  Additionally, it has never been well 
established how the DoS duty to notify should work in practice.164  
The duty to assist is equally vague and there is no information on the 
types of assistance that could be offered or the circumstances under 
which the assistance may be provided.165  This is unlikely to change.  
In 2013, following a GAO report that called attention to the lack of 
guidance on the implementation of the duty to inform, the Department 
of State replied, “embassies are in the best position to determine the 
level and form of notification that will address the requirement.”166  At 
the time of publication, there is still no publicly available guidance. 
The duty to notify and assist makes sense, especially given its 
consistency with one of the dual purposes of the law.167  It incentivizes 
nations to hold violators accountable and develop systems to prevent 
abuses from occurring.168  As such, it does makes sense to keep the 
                                                
162 22 U.S.C.S. § 2378d(c). 
163 There is authority for the DoD to provide limited human rights 
training to security forces that would otherwise be prohibited, but no further 
assistance is authorized. Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, 128 Stat. 
3292. 
164 GAO 13-866, supra note 42, at 11.  
165 Id.  at 17. 
166  It did, however, state that “further guidance . .  . would be 
worthwhile.” Id. at 25. 
167 As discussed in depth in the previous section. 
168 See supra Section IV. 
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duty, and to add it to the DoD version.  There is little reason why the 
funds withheld from one appropriation should trigger the duty while 
the withholding of other funds would not.  Further guidance on 
implementation is necessary, and it would likely be easier should the 
Leahy laws be changed to implement the suggestions this Article 
makes in cases where classified or sensitive material is the basis of 
credibility determinations.169  Regardless, if Congress decides the 
duties to inform and assist are worthwhile, they should appear in both 
versions.170 
C. Exceptions 
The final distinction is the additional exceptions in the DoD 
version.  In addition to remediation, DoD funds may still be provided 
to offending units if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with 
the Secretary of State, determines that it is required by “extraordinary 
circumstances” or when the assistance is necessary to assist in 
“disaster relief operations or other humanitarian or national security 
emergencies.”171  This Article will spend more time analyzing the 
necessity and effectiveness of specific Leahy exceptions in Section VI; 
however, to the extent that the “extraordinary circumstances” and 
“disaster relief” exceptions are retained, it makes little sense to limit 
them to one federal department and not the other. 
This is especially the case for issues involving disaster relief 
humanitarian and national security emergencies.  While there was 
little discussion in the Congressional record justifying the addition of 
these exceptions in 2014,172 there is no reason to more stringently limit 
the Department of State’s ability to engage in humanitarian assistance 
or disaster relief, even when taking the traditional difference of 
mission sets into account.  As such, this exception should be added to 
                                                
169 Id. 
170 Id. (showing that to the extent that the Department of State and 
Defense resume their traditional roles, it makes sense for the DoS to take a 
mentorship role, and the DoD to cut ties until sufficient progress has been made). 
171 10 U.S.C. § 362. 
172 S. REP. NO. 113-76, at 183 (2014) (containing the only written 
discussion is that “[I]n addition to a waiver for extraordinary circumstances, the 
provision would authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide training, 
equipment, or other assistance for disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or 
national security emergencies, as well as to conduct human rights training.”). 
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the DoS version of Leahy in the FAA. 
 The other exception, for “extraordinary circumstances,” is also 
exclusively available to the Department of Defense. This is justifiable 
as “extraordinary circumstances” that threaten U.S. national security 
may manifest in an endless variety of ways.173  In order to provide the 
DoD with necessary operational flexibility in times of war, on while 
engaging threats, it is important to never tie the Departments hands 
completely when it could otherwise be avoided. On the contrary, DoS 
security assistance is typically divorced from these “extraordinary 
circumstances” due to its more diplomatic nature.  That being said, to 
the extent that we are willing to recognize that these “extraordinary 
circumstances” exist, and as the approval rests solely at the Secretarial 
level, it makes sense to provide an equivalent provision to the 
Department of State.  
D. Summation 
As the law currently exists, there are three primary distinctions 
between the Department of State and Department of Defense versions 
of the law.  These distinctions may have served a deliberate purpose 
at one time but they now cause increased confusion in an already 
complex system.  The remediation standard was never intended to be 
different for the two versions, as a matter of policy it is now treated 
the same, and to the extent Congress wants to avoid frivolous legal 
arguments about the meaning of the distinction, it should be removed.  
The duty to inform and assist directly supports one of Leahy’s dual 
purposes and there is, therefore, little justification for keeping it out of 
the Department of Defense version of the law.  Lastly, the exceptions 
for humanitarian assistance, national security, and disaster relief 
should be included in the Department of State version of the law.  To 
the extent that Congress thinks we should make exceptions in these 
circumstances it shouldn’t matter where the humanitarian aid comes 
from. The exception for “extraordinary circumstances” is withheld to 
such a high level and used so infrequently, it too could have a 
Department of State equivalent with little risk.  
If the Departments of Defense and State maintain distinct 
missions, and the differences between those missions justify 
                                                
173 Again, the exact meaning of “extraordinary circumstances” has never 
been clearly defined in the Leahy context. 
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differences in their respective version of the Leahy law, it makes sense 
to maintain distinct standards.  However, as the mission between the 
agencies begins to overlap, and as the two more frequently work 
together when addressing Leahy issues, there is no sense in 
maintaining the distinction. Even when ignoring the “mission creep,” 
many of the differences between the two versions of the law have no 
justification.  The Leahy law is complex enough, needless statutory 
distinctions do nothing but complicate it even more and should, 
therefore, be eliminated. 
VI. ISSUE 4: HELPING OUR HELPERS—PROVIDING SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN FORCES PURSUING U.S. INTERESTS 
You are sitting in a conference room listening to a brief about 
an increasingly desperate situation.  A group of U.S. personnel in 
Afghanistan are about to come under attack by an insurgent force 
and due to the inequity in numbers, there is no chance they’ll be able 
to survive. There aren’t any U.S. forces in the area that will be able 
to make it in time but there is a local Afghan National Army unit 
only a few kilometers away.  Unfortunately, the Afghan unit lacks 
necessary arms and equipment to be of any benefit. You know that 
you can drop the necessary armaments via air support and ensure 
that they arrive in time.  Unfortunately, that particular unit is Leahy-
barred and you are prohibited from equipping them. In a situation 
like this, it seems obvious that there needs to be an exception to the 
rule.  When foreign security forces are working on behalf of U.S. 
forces or interests, Leahy sanctions may end up hurting the U.S. 
more than the offending unit.  There needs to be a mechanism for 
providing support in these situations without allowing for a 
complete degradation of the Leahy Law’s purpose.  This is 
increasingly important given how many functions have been handed 
over to foreign forces that were traditionally performed by the U.S. 
In December of 2014, following more than a decade of 
international military operations, the International Security 
Assistance Force (“ISAF”) ended combat operations and control of 
the NATO mission in Afghanistan and transitioned to Resolute 
Support (“RS”).174  RS and ISAF were both charged with training 
                                                
174 SULTAN BARAKAT & BROOKE SMITH-WINDSOR, POST-ISAF 
AFGHANISTAN: THE EARLY MONTHS 2 (2015). 
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Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), but unlike RS, ISAF was 
also actively engaged in combat operations with the Taliban 
Insurgency, a mission that has now been turned over to the ANSF.175  
Since the transition from ISAF to RS, the security situation in the 
country has not done particularly well.176 In fact, some analysts have 
gone as far as stating that the security situation in the country is the 
“worst since 2001,” when ISAF and U.S. forces first entered the 
country.177  As just one example of this, in May 2017, a truck bomb 
detonated near the German Embassy in downtown Kabul killing 92 
people and injuring another 450.178  Since the transition, and 
subsequent reduction in U.S. and NATO forces, the Taliban have 
made alarming gains. As of 2017, only 60% of the country remains 
under government control, the rest is either controlled by the 
Taliban, ISIS affiliates, or is under dispute.179  
In total, U.S. Forces have been reduced from over 100,000 
Service members in 2011 to approximately 13,000 in 2017.180 This 
means that many of the combat and security-related tasks that were 
once directly performed by U.S. and Coalition forces have now been 
passed on to the ANSF whose units are now responsible for keeping 
                                                
175 S.C. Res. 1386, ¶ 9 (Dec. 20, 2001). 
176 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, DECEMBER 2017 MONTHLY FORECAST 
24 (2017), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2017_12_forecast.pdf. 
177 David Wroe, Experts Back Afghanistan Troop Boost but Some Ask 
‘Where’s the Strategy?,’ THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 29, 2017, 5:34 
PM), https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/experts-back-afghanistan-troop-
boost-but-some-ask-wheres-the-strategy-20170529-gwfooa.html; Some Afghan 
Ministers Have Embezzled Millions – Anti-Graft Chief, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2011, 
9:02 AM, https://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-60064820111022; Aimal Faizi, 
Opinion, How Ghani’s Appeasement Towards Pakistan Has Worsened the 
Situation Inside Afghanistan, AFG. TIMES (June 10, 2017, 7:22 AM), 
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/how-ghanis-appeasement-towards-
pakistan-has-worsened-the-situation-inside-afghanistan-4694215/.  
178 Eltaf Najafizada, Suicide Truck Bomb in Afghan Capital Leaves at 
Least 93 Dead, BLOOMBERG POL. (May 31, 2017, 3:50 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-31/kabul-hit-by-worst-
attack-since-march-near-foreign-embassies. 
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U.S. Forces safe, and for a variety of counter-terrorism efforts that 
have a huge impact on U.S. national security interests.181 
This is likely a very different situation than the original 
Leahy drafters had in mind.  In Afghanistan today, security 
assistance and support is not being used solely to benefit 
Afghanistan, Afghan forces, and Afghan citizens, it is also being 
used to benefit the U.S. and its citizens that live and serve within 
and outside Afghanistan’s borders.  This can place practitioners in a 
difficult situation where they must choose between upholding the 
law and putting Americans at risk.  The solution to this conflict is 
this Article’s final recommendation; eliminate the “extraordinary 
circumstances” exception in favor of a new mechanism which can 
grant flexibility to military commanders when the true beneficiaries 
of security assistance to a foreign military unit are U.S interests. 
A. Leahy’s Operational Criticism 
In December 2013, while giving a speech on human rights 
and American interests, the National Security Advisor, Susan E. 
Rice, addressed a difficult balance that must be struck in American 
foreign policy.182  After stating that the advancement of democracy 
and respect for human rights is central in U.S. foreign policy, she 
continued with the following: 
 
Yet, obviously, advancing human rights is not and has never been our only 
interest.  Every U.S. president has a sworn duty to protect the lives and the 
fortunes of the American people against immediate threats. That is 
President Obama’s first responsibility, and mine.  We must defend the 
United States, our citizens and our allies with every tool at our disposal, 
including, when necessary, with military force.  We must do all we can to 
counter weapons of mass destruction, aggression, terrorism, and 
catastrophic threats to the global economy, upon which our way of life 
                                                
181 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN 
AFGHANISTAN JANUARY 2009, at 8 (2009), 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pd
f. 
182 Susan E. Rice, Nat’l Sec. Advisor, Remarks at the Human Rights First 
Annual Summit, Human Rights:  Advancing American Interests and Values (Dec. 
4, 2013) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/12/04/remarks-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice-human-rights-
advancing-am) (emphasis added). 
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depends.  Anything less would be a dereliction of duty. As we seek to 
secure these core interests, we sometimes face painful dilemmas when the 
immediate need to defend our national security clashes with our 
fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights.  Let’s be 
honest: at times, as a result, we do business with governments that do not 
respect the rights we hold most dear.  We make tough choices.  When 
rights are violated, we continue to advocate for their protection.  But we 
cannot, and I will not pretend that some short-term tradeoffs do not exist . 
. . American foreign policy must sometimes strike a difficult balance—not 
between our values and our interests, because these almost invariably 
converge with time, but more often between our short and long-term 
imperatives.”183 
 
While not specifically mentioning the Leahy Laws by name, 
Rice’s comments address one of the Leahy Law’s most common 
criticisms.  In 2013, on the eve of the U.S. drawdown in 
Afghanistan, military leaders, diplomats, and Senator Leahy 
gathered to debate the Leahy Law’s role in the country.184  At the 
time, as discussed earlier in this section, the Pentagon was working 
to train and equip local security services to combat militants so that 
American troops didn’t have to.185  Admiral William H. McRaven, 
a Navy SEAL who at the time was the commander of U.S. Special 
Operations Command, testified that while he supported the spirit of 
the law, its enforcement had complicated the nation’s ability to 
“train and equip foreign security forces, many of which are now 
front-line units fighting Al Qaeda and its affiliates.”186  He added 
that while U.S. officials were dedicated to teaching foreign forces 
the importance of human rights, the law “has restricted us in a 
number of countries across the globe in our ability to train units that 
we think need to be trained.”187 
Even when an allegation has not yet been confirmed, there 
are problems for military commanders.  The vetting process can be 
incredibly slow, taking weeks or months to verify whether a 
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184 Eric Schmitt, Military Says Law Barring U.S. Aid to Rights Violators 
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violation occurred, and months more to remediate.  General John 
Kelly, then the Commander of U.S. Southern Command, once stated 
that he had to “wait until the State Department sorts these things out 
before I can send people in.”188 
These concerns are likely the reason that exceptions, 
exemptions, and various notwithstanding authorities exist; in some 
extraordinary circumstances, we need to assist foreign forces in 
order to help ourselves.  That being said, the existing exceptions do 
not provide much help. Congress has never stated the actual 
standard to be applied for the “extraordinary circumstances” 
exception,189 and the use of notwithstanding authorities, located in 
the ASFF and other similar appropriations, is typically met with 
criticism.190  On the other hand, there needs to be meaningful 
limitations on these exceptions or else the entire point of the Leahy 
law may be frustrated.  The proposed solution must provide a 
meaningful restraint on abuse while simultaneously addressing the 
operational concerns of U.S. military leaders.  Luckily, that 
mechanism already exists thanks, in part, to a Congressman from 
Arkansas named Bill Alexander. 
B. Who’s Benefiting Whom? The “Big ‘T’ / Little ‘t’” Method. 
As a general rule, the Department of State has the 
responsibly, exclusive authority, and appropriated funding to 
conduct foreign assistance on behalf of the U.S. Government.  This 
includes all assistance to foreign military or governments, 
development of infrastructure projects, and humanitarian 
assistance.191  The Department of Defense may only provide 
security assistance using its funds when there is a specific 
                                                
188 Id. 
189 DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35 n.30.  
190 See SIGAR 17-47-IP, supra note 45.   
191 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created the authority for the 
executive branch to conduct foreign assistance on behalf of the United States. See 
Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012); 
see also EXEC. ORDER NO. 10973, pt. 5 (1961) (delegating authority to conduct 
foreign assistance created by Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act to the 
Department of State). 
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Congressional authorization,192 or when the funding, while being 
provided to train a foreign force, is actually intended to benefit U.S. 
military forces; a category of training known as “Little ‘t’ training.”  
The distinction between Big ‘T’ Training and Little ‘t’ training is 
commonly used by military fiscal attorneys to determine whether 
using DoD funds for foreign security assistance is proper.  The 
distinction traces its roots back to a U.S. Comptroller General 
opinion, known as the “Honorable Bill Alexander” decision.193 
1. The Ahuas Tara Exercise 
In 1983, The Department of Defense commenced Ahuas 
Tara, a joint-combined military exercise in Honduras.194  Over the 
course of the six-month exercise, 12,000 American Troops 
participated in maneuvers alongside the Honduran military.195  The 
Department of Defense also built a 3,500 foot airstrip, constructed 
nearly 300 wood huts, deployed radar systems, provided medical 
assistance to 50,000 Honduran Civilians and veterinary assistance 
to 40,000 animals, built a school, and provided training to hundreds 
of Honduran military personnel.196  A Congressional delegation, led 
by Congressman William “Bill” Alexander, requested that the 
Comptroller General of the  conduct an investigation to determine 
whether it was appropriate for the Department of Defense to conduct 
this exercise using its standard operations funds.  After a lengthy 
discussion, the Comptroller General concluded that many of the 
activities carried out by the Department of the Defense were 
unlawfully funded and should have been paid through security 
assistance funds, within the purview of the Department of State.197  
Nonetheless, it was concluded that minor amounts of 
interoperability and safety instruction did not constitute “training” 
as that term is used in the context of security assistance, and could 
                                                
192 For example, the ASFF. See Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 
(ASFF), DEF. SEC. COOPERATION AGENCY, 
https://www.dsca.mil/programs/afghanistan-security-forces-fund-asff. 
193 The Honorable Bill Alexander, House of Representatives, B-213137, 
63 Comp. Gen. 422 (1984). 
194 Id. at 447. 
195 Id.  
196 Id.  
197 Id.  
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therefore be financed with standard DoD Funds.”198  
This caveat became known as “Little ‘t’ training,” training 
or instruction for foreign forces which had the primary purpose of 
promoting interoperability, safety, and/or familiarization with U.S. 
military forces.  The overall benefit is primarily directed at U.S. 
forces, who learn how to fight with and alongside allied militaries, 
use allied military equipment, and work in settings they would likely 
find themselves should they ever fight on multinational battlefields.  
Because the primary beneficiaries in those situations are U.S. forces, 
the Comptroller General opined that DoD funds are appropriate.  
The alternative became known as “Big ‘T’ Training.”  This type of 
training consisted of security assistance undertaken to improve a 
foreign military force’s operational readiness; the traditional form 
of security assistance that must be funded by the Department of 
State.199 
2. Application to Leahy 
This same approach can be used in the Leahy context.  
Assuming that a foreign unit is Leahy-barred, military leaders are 
currently prohibited from providing any assistance regardless of 
their intent in doing so.  When the intent is to train, develop, and 
mentor units for the benefit of foreign nations, it makes sense to 
prohibit security assistance, that’s exactly what the Leahy law is 
designed to do.  The problem arises when foreign forces are 
receiving U.S. assistance and equipment to aid in the pursuit of U.S. 
objectives, or to protect and support U.S. forces.  These are the 
situations that give rise to the complaints and criticisms made by 
Ms. Rice, Admiral McRaven, and General Kelly.  Just as we would 
never bar a U.S. unit or individual from receiving support, we should 
not bar foreign forces when they are acting as U.S. surrogates.  
The solution is to establish a Leahy equivalent to the Big ‘T’ 
Little ‘t’ distinction.  Dividing “assistance” into Big ‘A’ Assistance 
and little “a” assistance grants military commanders the ability to 
use funds that would otherwise be prohibited when the beneficiary 
of the security assistance is primarily the U.S. Big “A” assistance, 
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199 CONT. & FISCAL DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S LEGAL CENTER 
& SCHOOL., U.S. ARMY FISCAL LAW DESKBOOK 10-10 (2019). 
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like Big “T” Training, would be defined as “foreign security 
assistance primarily undertaken to improve a foreign military 
force’s operational readiness.”200  This is traditional security 
assistance that the Leahy law was intended to prohibit when there is 
a confirmed gross violation of human rights.  This will be 
distinguished from “Little ‘a’ assistance” which would be limited to 
assistance that primarily benefits the U.S. 
3. Factors of Consideration 
In order to assist in this determination under the Big ‘T’/ 
little ‘t’ training paradigm, a number of factors have been 
established to assist practitioners.201  Similarly, the Big ‘A’ little ‘a’ 
distinction could rely on the following: (1) relationship between the 
U.S. and the foreign force; (2) the location the assistance will take 
place; (3) the amount of benefit received by the foreign force; and 
(4) the past performance of the foreign force.  These could either be 
written directly into the statute, or established elsewhere in 
administrative policy.  The following paragraphs in this section will 
summarize each of these factors and how they would be used to 
determine the primary beneficiary of the proposed assistance. 
The first factor is the relationship between the U.S. and the 
foreign security force that will be receiving the security assistance.  
This factor is intended to demonstrate the degree to which the 
foreign force is acting as a U.S. surrogate.  On one end of the 
spectrum are forces that integrated into a U.S. chain of command.  
In some situations, foreign forces work directly alongside U.S. 
armed forces, following U.S. orders, and executing joint missions.  
On the other end of the spectrum are forces that are wholly 
independent, that are not subject to U.S. oversight or guidance, and 
function largely as if they were independent contractors.  The closer 
the relationship, and the more the U.S. relied on the unit in the 
pursuit of U.S. objectives, the better justification for categorizing 
the support as “Little ‘a’ assistance.  This factor should also consider 
relative advancement of the foreign security force.  The regular 
                                                
200 Id. 
201 These include: cumulative financial costs, training duration; size of 
foreign military training force; expected foreign military, training proficiency 
outcome, training location, and primary training beneficiary. Id. 
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armed forces of a sovereign state should be held to a higher standard 
than a local militia that does not have the benefit of regular human 
rights training or a developed understanding of the Rule of Law. 
The next factor considers the location the assistance will take 
place, the closer to active hostilities, and the more likely U.S. forces 
will be at risk, the more likely the U.S. is the primary beneficiary.  
Practitioners could consider whether there is a designated 
International Armed Conflict (IAC), a Non-international Armed 
Conflict (NIAC), or whether the hostile forces were undeclared.  
This factor would also take into account any available information 
on the current security situation.  The more dependent U.S. forces 
are on foreign security and protection, the more likely they should 
qualify as little ‘a’ assistance. 
Third would be the degree to which the foreign security force 
benefits from the assistance.  This would be measured by the 
cumulative cost of the assistance, the duration, and the breadth of 
the benefit.  Providing foreign security forces with large, expensive 
equipment or new construction will likely have a benefit well after 
the immediate benefit to the U.S. has ended and therefore increases 
the overall benefit received by the foreign security force.  
Furthermore, the analysis should consider whether the beneficiary 
would be another sovereign nation as a whole or a regional or local 
force or militia.  For assistance that would benefit an allied nation 
as a whole rather than a specific Leahy-barred unit, there is a 
stronger argument in allowing the support as less of the benefit will 
be received by the barred unit. 
The final factor is the past performance of the unit.  This 
would encompass the severity of the human rights violation, 
whether it was an isolated incident, and whether the unit has taken 
any steps to address it.  If a unit has been taking steps to remediate, 
or hold the responsible individuals accountable, but has not yet 
satisfied the Leahy’s remediation standard, it strengthens the 
justification in providing assistance. 
By using these factors, decision makers will be better able to 
determine whether proposed assistance will primarily benefit the 
U.S., or, the foreign Leahy-barred unit.  This analysis will allow for 
continued security assistance support to forces that the U.S. depends 
on for the protection and security of U.S. forces and interests.  
Foreign forces directly responsible for providing security or aid in a 
54https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/4
2019] LEAHY—SHARPENING THE BLADE 553 
role that would typically be fulfilled by the U.S., serving in an area 
with active contingencies, that would only receive minimal long-
term assistance, will be eligible for necessary little ‘a’ assistance.  
Conversely, repeat offenders within allied armed forces, working 
independently of U.S. forces in an area free of hostilities and likely 
to receive extensive, costly support would remain barred as 
recipients of Big ‘A’ Assistance. 
4. Mitigating the Risks 
The greatest risk in changing the mechanism from 
“extraordinary circumstances” to the method detailed above, is that 
it there is a chance the exception could swallow the rule.  There is 
an argument that everything that the DoD does is intended to benefit 
national security, otherwise, it would not be the DoD’s role at all.  
In order to mitigate that risk, the exception would have to be 
reserved for the strategic, rather than tactical level.202  To do this, all 
that is necessary is to require a high-level approval authority for the 
exception.  Like “extraordinary circumstances,” it could be reserved 
to the Secretary of Defense, or, delegated as far as the Combatant 
Commanders.203  This will ensure that the exception is not relied 
upon unless there is a legitimate need to do so.  There should also 
be a Congressional notification requirement, like the current statute 
already has.204  It is also important to note that this exception would 
only allow the DoD to continue funding a foreign unit in support of 
its mission.  Nothing would prevent the full investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment of responsible parties. 
                                                
202 Strategic, Operational, and Tactical are the three levels of war. The 
strategic level focuses on the outcome of a war as a whole. Tactical, on the other 
hand, focuses instead on individual maneuvers and battles on the smallest scale. 
U.S. Armed Forces, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 
United States, at I-8 (2013), 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf. 
203 Commanders of Combatant Commands (COCOMs), geographic 
multi-service commands that report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the 
President of the United States. Id. at II-25. 
204 22 U.S.C. § 2378d. 
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C. Summation 
As National Security Advisor Rice said in 2013, the U.S. 
sometimes faces painful dilemmas requiring choices between the 
need to defend our national security interests and our ongoing, 
fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights.205  These 
potential conflicts were likely the reason why an “extraordinary 
circumstances” exception was included in the DoD’s version of the 
law from the start.  However, despite the existence of this exception, 
senior military leaders have still attested to difficulties navigating 
the tension between these values.  In order to arm our military 
leaders with the tools needed to keep our interests and 
Servicemembers safe, while being true to the principles that form 
the basis for the Leahy laws, we need to provide sufficient 
operational flexibility to allow them to decide how to handle 
difficult situations.  By changing from a vaguely defined exception 
to a methodology based in existing law, military commanders, and 
those advising them, will be better able to simultaneously protect 
American principals, and the Soldiers that defend them. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Each of the recommendations listed in this Article could be 
further expanded upon and form the basis for further research.  The 
intent of this Article is to demonstrate that there is a divide between 
the original intent of the Leahy Law and the way the law operates in 
effect.  Armed with decades of lessons learned and data gathered 
from Leahy practitioners, Congress should update the law to ensure 
that the intent and effect are better aligned.206  By setting the 
                                                
205 Rice, supra note 182. 
206 While the thesis of this paper is that statutory amendments in 
Congress is the best mechanism to make these changes, much can be done as a 
matter of policy. Lacking a statutory definition, the Departments of State and 
Defense can order practitioners to interpret “credible evidence” to mean “probable 
cause;” they can interpret extraordinary circumstances to invoke the reasoning in 
the “Honorable Bill Alexander” decision from GAO, and they can consider the 
dual purposes when making credibility, remediation, and notwithstanding 
decisions. This may also galvanize Congress to correct deficiencies in the new 
interpretations which may lead to the Congressional, statutory solution that is 
ultimately preferred. This Article is also silent on the role of Congressional 
politics or partisan polarity and how that would affect implementation of the 
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standard of proof in Leahy cases as “credible information,” 
Congress intended to specify the types of evidence to be considered; 
however, without clear guidance on what that standard means, and 
how to handle difficult cases, practitioners cannot hope to properly 
assess violations.  Without the discretion to choose between Leahy’s 
dual purposes, practitioners and commanders lose the operational 
flexibility necessary to select the optimal objectives when a conflict 
arises.  While differences between the Department of State and 
Defense may have once justified distinctions in their versions of the 
law, that justification has been weakened as the mission of the two 
has become increasingly overlapped, and as decisions are more 
often being made by inter-agency committees.  Finally, while the 
original drafters always recognized the need for flexibility in 
Leahy’s application in order to prevent disproportionate harm to the 
U.S. national security in certain “extraordinary circumstances,” the 
mechanisms chosen lack the practical effectiveness or guidance that 
is necessary to be used properly or deliberately.  
This by no means excuses the problems that have been 
occurring in the law’s implementation. The processing times are too 
long, the tracking system, INVEST, is too convoluted, and the role 
of the Department of Defense is too marginalized.  These should all 
be reexamined, and upgrades to the statute should be matched with 
upgrades the policies, programs, and processes that are currently in 
place.  Many of the sources cited in this Article contain a myriad of 
great suggestions that would increase Leahy’s functionality.  
However, these administrative changes will ultimately be futile if 
some of the fundamental problems identified in this Article are not 
solved.  We need to improve the heart of the law and not just its 
application. 
There is no doubt that the Leahy law is a critical part of the 
United States’ foreign policy and that its aim warrants continued 
effort to achieve.  However, we should not fear revisiting the 
original intentions now that we have seen how it operates in the real 
world.  It must be continually improved or risk becoming an empty 
remnant of its former self, or worse, become the operational burden 
that its critics espouse.  America needs to be a world leader in the 
                                                
proposed amendments as it would be outside the scope of this Article and likely 
warrant extensive scholarship on its own. 
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area of human rights but it requires functional tools in order to do so 
and when it comes to Leahy, Congress needs to sharpen the blade.  
It is the author’s hope that, by implementing the statutory changes 
presented in this Article, it can do just that. 
 
* * * 
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